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ARISTOTLE ON TEMPERANCE1*
Charles M. Young
Departeent of Philosophy
The Clareeont Graduate School
When ee Mere cut off froe our supplies and
forced to go Mithout food, as is coMMon on
Military caMpaigns, no one else endured it
Mell. But Mhen there Mas plenty to eat,
he alone Mas really able to enjoy it.a
Aristotle thinks that the virtues of character — courage, teeperance,
liberality, and the rest — give rise to3 happiness, but he never tells us
Mhy. Norse yet, his vieMS about happiness and about the virtues sake it hard
to see Mhat explanation he could have given. EN. 1.7* tells us that Me are
happy Mhen our capacities for rational thought and rational action are real
ized with excellence. 9 If so, the virtues Mhich give rise to happiness Mould
sees to be the intellectual virtues of practical and theoretical Misdoe,
phronesis and sophia. But courage, teeperance, liberality, and the rest are
virtues of character, not of the intellect (cf. 1.13, 1103*3-10). So Mhy does
Aristotle think they are sources of happiness?
In the hope of solving this problee eventually, I have been Morking
through the details of Aristotle's discussions of the various virtues of char
acter in EN III-V and EE III. This paper presents a portion of that Mork:4*
ay account of Aristotle's vieM of teeperance.
I
A useful place to begin is Mith Aristotle's doctrine of the Mean, his
idea that each virtue of character is a eesotes or Mean state.7* There are teo
parts to this doctrine, one ontological and one behavioral. Ontologically, a
virtue is a eeeber of a triad, not one of a pair of opposites. Hoeever natu
ral it eay be to think of courage as opposed to coMardice, or of teeperance as
opposed to profligacy, Aristotle argues in EN II.6 that each virtue is instead
a Mean state Mhich is in soee sense "betMeen”two vices,, one of excess and one
of defect (1107*2-3).· Behaviorally, a virtue is a Mean state in that it
gives rise to intereediate actions and passions. ttHhile the vices fall short
of, or go beyond, Mhat is required in action and passion," Aristotle says,
"the virtue finds and chooses Mhat is internediate" (1107*3-6).7 Aristotle
takes the ontological thesis to be a consequence of the behavioral one. "A
virtue is a sean state (eesotes).* he«says, because it aies at Mhat is interaediate (to Meson)" (1106*27-28).»·
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complications, and a subtler account of Aristotle's conception of temperance
is accordingly to be sought.
II
Ne can begin to work towards a better account by trying to understand
Aristotle's restriction of temperance to the pleasures11 human beings share
with animals. He argues for this restriction in EN III.10 as follows. First
he distinguishes between pleasures of the body and those of the soul, and
asserts that temperance has to do only with the former: "People are not
called temperate," he says, "in relation to the pleasures of learning, nor
profligate in relation to the pleasures of learning" (1117*28-1118*1). Next
he sorts bodily pleasures into types by reference to the sensory modalities
they involve, and, claiming that temperance is not concerned with the pleas
ures of sight, hearing, or smell,12 he concludes that it is restricted to the
pleasures of touch and taste, which human beings share with the other ani
mals13 <1118*1-23)· Surprisingly, Aristotle goes on to exclude even the
pleasures of taste from temperance. Tasting involves discrimination, he
claims, and this is not what profligates enjoy.14 They seek rather the pleas
ure that comes from touch, whether in eating, drinking, or sexual activity1*
(1118*26-32). Because of this, profligacy — and temperance as well — is
restricted to the animal pleasures that derive from the sense of touch
(1118*1-4).
How are we to understand Aristotle's restriction of temperance to animal
pleasures? Usually, when Aristotle connects temperance to animal pleasures,
his point is the simple one that the class of pleasures with which temperance
is concerned happens to coincide with the class of pleasures to which the
other animals are sensitive. He actually argues for this coincidence in the
EE,14 and he makes the point in the EN as well, saying that "temperance and
profligacy are concerned with the sorts of pleasures in which the other ani
mals also share" (1118*23-25). But the concluding remarks of III.10 break new
ground:
Profligacy, then, corresponds to the most common (koinotate) of the
senses, and it would seem that it is rightly reproached, because it be
longs to us not insofar as we are human beings but insofar as we are
animals. Tq, revel in such pleasures, or to be excessively fond of them,
is bestial. (1118*1-4)
The claims here that profligacy "corresponds to the most common of the senses"
and that it belongs to us "insofar as we are animals" should be understood in
light of the psychology of the Djb Anima, which argues that sense perception
(aisthesis) in general17 and the sense of touch in particular are definitive
of animality. Plants, for Aristotle, are able to absorb nourishment directly
from the environment. Animals lack this ability, and in consequence they need
the ability to seize nourishment from their surroundings if they are to stay
alive. This, Aristotle thinks, requires sense perception and especially the 1
sense of touch. Touch is the crucial sense, in Aristotle's view, because the
properties of nourishment — heat, cold, wetness, and dryness — are the pro
per objects of that sense (De Anima 11.3, 414*5-15). Possession of the sense
of touch, then, is for Aristotle part of what makes an organism an animal, and
because it alone is common to all animals he can describe it in the EJY as "the
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long enough to reproduce. This requires that they take in nourishment, which
Aristotle explains as what is hot, cold, wet, and dry. In the case of ani
mals, the need for nourishment is registered in the psychic states of hunger
and thirst, the one being an appetite for what is dry and hot, the other for
what is cold and wet. Prompted by these appetites, an animal is led to seek
repletion by eating and drinking appropriate substances. The ingested matter
is then broken down by the process of digestion, and built back up into the
body of the organism by metabolise. In this way the animal's body is main
tained, so that it can reproduce.
The common appetites of EN 111.11 are clearly the hungers and thirsts
mentioned in this account of nutrition. Aristotle connects common appetites
with physical needs (1118*10), and he says that they are directed simply to
wards nourishment, not towards particular sorts of nourishment (1118*9-12).
Furthermore, his calling these appetites "natural* (1118*9) suggests that he
takes them to have their origin in the bodily or animal nature of human
beings, a suggestion buttressed by his labeling these appetites "common*
(1118*8) just after calling the characteristically animal sense, touch, the
"most common" of the senses (ΙΠ.10, 1118*1). That common appetites are
grounded in our animal nature, finally, explains why they are universal to
human beings (1118*10-11). Ne may take it, then, that common appetites are
simply instances of hunger and thirst.80
Peculiar appetites are another matter. They differ from common appe
tites first in being more finely focused: a common appetite is directed sim
ply at nourishment, while a peculiar appetite is directed at a particular sort
of nourishment. They also differ in what they require for explanation, Since
common appetites are simply the psychic manifestations of physical needs, our
having them can be explained solely by reference to physiology. But because
peculiar appetites are more finely focused than common ones, our possessing
them requires more by way of explanation. Hy needing food may explain why I
want to eat something, but it cannot explain why 1 want to eat Athenian pas
tries rather than broccoli.
Nhere is the fuller explanation of peculiar appetites to be found?
Surely in the fact that different people like to eat — derive physical pleas
ure from eating — different sorts of foods. Consider this passage from
III.11:
Regarding peculiar pleasures many people go wrong, and they go wrong in
many ways. For when people are said to be fond of such-and-such, it is
either because they enjoy things they shouldn't, or because they enjoy
them more than most people do, or because they don't enjoy them as they
should, and profligates exceed in all these ways. For they enjoy things
they shouldn't (because the things are hateful); and if they do enjoy
the things they should, they enjoy them more than they should, and more
than most people. (1118*21-27)
Here Aristotle is clearly not talking about the pleasures we get simply from
repletion; such pleasures could come from any sort of food. He is talking
instead about the sense enjoyment we get from eating certain sorts of foods.
The distinction between common and peculiar appetites, then, is the dis
tinction between appetites simply for food and drink and appetites for the
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one's wanting to eat something, because one likes it, even when one doesn't
need to eat.
V
He may now turn to Aristotle's account of temperance itself. Here again
it will be useful to contrast the EN with the EE.. In characterizing temper
ance and its correlative vices, the E£ says this:
He who is so disposed as to fall short of such things as nearly everyone
must share in and take pleasure in is insensible, or whatever he should
be called; and he who is excessive is profligate. For everyone by na
ture enjoys these things and has appetites for them, and not everyone is
called profligate. The reason for this is that they do not feel more
pleasure than they should when they get them, nor more pain than they
should when they do not. Nor are they unfeeling, for they do not fall
short in feeling pleasure or pain; if anything they exceed. Since there
is excess and deficiency concerning these objects, it is clear that
there is also a mean state, and that this disposition is best, and that
it is the opposite of both the others. Hence, if temperance is the best
disposition concerning the things with which the profligate is con
cerned, the mean state regarding the pleasant sensible objects just men
tioned will be temperance, a mean state between profligacy and insen
sibility. (111.2, 1231*26-39)
The EE thus characterizes temperance by contrasting it with the vices of in
sensibility and profligacy. It observes, first, that insensible are deficient
while profligates are excessive regarding the pleasures of food and drink.
Then it locates temperance between insensibility and profligacy, claiming that
the existence of excessive and deficient states implies the existence of a
mean state, that this mean state is the best state, and that this best state
is temperance. The point to notice is that the EE. offers no positive account
of temperance. Instead, it treats temperance as a privative motivational
state, calling temperate those who avoid the errors of the profligate and the
insensible.** To be sure, it does imply that temperate people enjoy the
pleasures of eating and drinking "as they should," and that they do not feel
more pain "than they should" when they fail to get them. But because it of
fers no explanation of what the proper enjoyment of food and drink consists
in, it gives these phrases no real content.
The EN/s account of temperance begins in the same way:
The temperate person is moderately disposed towards pleasures. He does
not enjoy the things which the profligate most enjoys; if anything he
detests them. In general, he neither enjoys things which he should not,
nor enjoys too much anything of this sort. Hhen Csuch pleasures! are
absent he feels neither pain nor appetite, except moderately, nor does
he desire them more than he should, nor when he shouldn't, and so on.
U1I.11, 1119*11-15)
So far, we are no better off in the EN than we were in the EE, — we have no
idea of exactly what foods and drinks temperate people should and should not
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to take pleasure in what is bad tor thee, they are tree to eat and drink cer
tain things solely tor the sake ot the pleasure they bring. Eating and drink
ing say be activities in which we engage because we are aniaals, but teaperate
people are able to accept — indeed, to welcoae — the pleasures these activ
ities bring.**
Nhat about protligates and insensible people? Aristotle accuses the
profligates of a Multitude of sins. He says that they:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

enjoy things
enjoy things
enjoy things
enjoy things
prefer these

they should not (III.11, 1118*23, b25),
More than they should (*23, *26),
sore than aost people (*23-24, *27),
in the wrong way (*24), and
pleasures to other pleasures (1119*2-3).

Errors of three different kinds are attributed to profligates in these pas
sages. First there are the errors in object cited in (a): profligates take
pleasure in eating and drinking inappropriate objects. Then there are the
errors in degree Mentioned in (b), (c), and (d): even froa appropriate ob
jects, profligates derive aore pleasure than is appropriate. Finally there is
the error in preference of (e). Of these errors, the first is not unique to
the profligate. Aristotle distinguishes profligates froa incontinent persons
on the grounds that the foraer do, while the latter do not, believe that the
objects in which they indulge are appropriate (cf., e.g., VII.8, 1151*11-14).
No doubt errors of degree are also coaaon to incontinent agents as well.*4
Thus it is the error in preference which is fundaaental to profligacy: as
Aristotle says, "the profligate is led by his desire to prefer the pleasures
[of food and drink] to other things" (111.11, 1119*1-3). The excessive state
with respect to the pleasures of food and drink is at bottoa a cognitive
state, not an appetitive one. Profligates think that these aniaal pleasures
are worthy of serious pursuit.
Those deficient with respect to the pleasures of food and drink are the
insensible. Aristotle explains how they are deficient by saying that insen
sible people find nothing pleasant, and nothing aore pleasant than anything
else (111.11, 1119*9). Their condition is thus that they experience and .
satisfy coaaon appetites, and not peculiar ones. They eat and drink what is
necessary to Maintain their bodies, but they take no pleasure in doing so.
Insensible people, then, are not to be confused with anorexics. Their problea
is not that they eat and drink too little, but that they do not partake of the
pleasures eating and drinking naturally bring. They disdain the pleasures
teaperate people welcoae.
VI
Before suaaing up, I should deal with a few loose ends: taste, sex, and
wine. Earlier I noted in passing that one curious aspect of Aristotle's
account of teaperance is that he excludes the pleasures of taste froa its
sphere. This idea is coaaon to both the E£ and the EN, but the EN offers a
aore effective defense of it. The E£ offers us only the unargued claia that
the other aniaals are insensitive to such pleasures, together with a point of
folk wisdoa to the effect that gluttons pray for long throats, not for long
tongues (III.2, 1231*12-17). The EN does better, saying that taste involves

il
elsewhere,2* but our appetites for sex, unlike our appetites for food and
drink, do not spring fro· physical needs»30 Ne can live without sex, but not
without food and drink.31 Aristotle ignores alcohol, then, because our appe
tite for it has no physical basis. And he treats sex uncertainly, because,
although it does have a physical basis, it is not based in a physical need.
VII
In a final view of Aristotelian teeperance, the eleeent to stress is its
connection with anieality. For Aristotle, huean beings are rational animals.
As anieals, we are naturally subject to appetites for food and drink, and we
are are sensitive to the pleasures the satisfaction of these appetites can
bring. Aristotelian teeperance concerns the place of such pleasures in huean
life. Since our anieality is not the distinguishing aspect of our hueanity,
the pleasures relating to it should not be of eajor concern to us. Still, our
susceptibility to these pleasures is grounded in the sort of creature we are:
our anieality is part of our essence. The field of Aristotelian temperance,
then, is the relation of a rational anieal to its anieality, as expressed in
the pleasures it takes in the anieal activities of eating and drinking. Tem
perate people relate properly to their anieality, and accord the pleasures
attaching to it their proper worth. Insensible people and profligates, each
in their own way, misjudge the pleasures and misjudge themselves.
Profligates over-value the pleasures of food and drink. Such pleasures,
on Aristotle's account, do have value, but their value is limited. Eating and
drinking are activities we engage in because we are anieals; they are not dis
tinctively huean activities. Accordingly, the pleasures these activities
bring are not distinctively huean pleasures,32 and in attaching the importance
they do to such pleasures, profligates value thee more than they are worth.
This failing, though, is symptomatic of a deeper one. Huean beings have
anieality as their genus and rationality as their specific differentia. The
distinctively huean pleasures, then, are those which attach to rationality.
It may be said, therefore, that in preferring anieal pleasures to rational
ones, profligates show that they do not understand the kind of being they are.
Their preferences are evidence that they identify themselves not with their
rationality, as Aristotle recommends (X.7, 1177*26-1170*8), but with their
animality. They see themselves as anieals, not as huean beings, and to say
that they are bestial is an accurate reproach <cf. III.10, 1110*1-4).
Insensible people err in the contrary direction. The pleasures of eat
ing and drinking are not worth as euch as profligates think, but they are
worth something, and insensible people go wrong in taking little or no pleas
ure in food and drink. Their error, like the profligates', reflects a more
serious one. Our animality is not the most important part of our hueanity,
but it really is a part of it. Anieality is our genus, and in taking little
or no pleasure in food and drink, insensible people in effect repudiate this
part of their hueanity. As Aristotle puts it, "insensibility is not human”
(III.11, 1119*6-7); "a creature to whom nothing is pleasant, and to whom
nothing is more pleasant than anything else is very far from a huean being"
(1119*9-10). Profligates may identify themselves with their animality, but
insensible people disown it altogether.33 The name Aristotle coins for their
condition, anai sthesi a (insensibility) is singularly apt: anai sthesia is the

FOOTNOTES
* I adopt the sost usual translation of sophrosune. despite its inade
quacies, because the alternatives — "self-control" and "self-restraint" -are even less acceptable. Either alternative carries the strong suggestion
that a display of sophrosune requires reason to defeat appetite in a struggle
within the teeperate agent, a struggle the existence of which Aristotle denies
(cf., e.g., Nicoeachean Ethics II.3t 1104*3-7). Etyeologically, sophrosune
weans soeething like eental health — being of "sound" (sos) "wind" (phren) -and an ideal translation would capture this idea. The standard general treatsent of the Breek notion is H. Norths Sophrosune: Self-Knowledqe and Selj_Restraint in 6reek Literature, (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,
I960).
3 Alcibiades describing Socrates at Potidaea, in Plato's Svsposiuw
(219e8-220a2).
3 If a capacity is one the realization of which is part of what happiness
consists in, I say that it oives rise to happiness and that it is a source of
happiness. It is by now cossonly held that, asong the goods Aristotle recog
nizes, we should distinguish between (a) cosponents of happiness, like coura
geous or liberal activity, and (b) instrusental seans to happiness, like
wealth. But this division ignores goods like the virtues thesselves, which
are (c) sources of happiness in the sense just explained, and also (d) esbel1ishaents of happiness, like good looks or fine children (cf. Nicoeachean
Ethics 1.8, 1099*33-*6, and 1.9, 1099*26-28). These four kinds of goods are
related in that instrusental goods affect the extent to which the virtues give
rise to virtuous activity, while esbel1ishsents affect the degree of happiness
enjoyed by the virtuously active.
* Henceforth I refer to the Nicoeachean Ethics with "EN" and to the
Eudesian Ethics with "EE”, to books with Rosan nuserals and to chapters with
Arabic ones. Thus the first sentence of the Nicoeachean Ethics is EN 1.1,
1094*1-3.
•
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The definition of 1.7 says that happiness is "activity of soul in
accordance with excellence" (1098 a 16-17); 1.13, 1103 a 3-10 (asong other
passages), sakes it plain that this definition includes both theoretical and
practical activity.
* For accounts of aspects of Aristotle's conception of courage, see sy
papers "Aristotle on Courage," in 6. Howe, ed., Husanitas; Essays in Honor of.
Ralph Ross (Claresont, Ca.: Scripps College Press, 1977), pp. 194-203, and
"Virtue and Flourishing in Aristotle's Ethics," in D. Depew, ed., The Greeks
and the 6ood Life (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co·, 1980), pp. 138-156.
7 A source of confusion in dealing with the literature on the doctrine of
the sean is that Aristotle uses two words — the adjective seson and the noun
sesotes — both of which can be translated as "sean." Thus Rackhas translates
sesotes as "sean state" and seson as "sean,”while Ross renders sesotes with
"sean" and seson with "intersediate." As a result, it is not always clear
whether in discussing the doctrine of the sean a cossentator has in sind the
idea (i) that a virtue is a sesotes or (ii) that a virtue aiss at what is

12 It is interesting that the |jN allows lor excess and deficiency with
respect to the pleasures of sight, hearing, and taell, while the EE does not.
Perhaps the EE. is silent on this point because it typically assunes that the
presence of excess and deficiency by itself inplies the existence of a virtu
ous aean state (cf., e.g., III.2, 1231*34-36, on tenperance, and III.3,
1231·*15-219 on gentleness). On this assumption, the Mention of excess and
deficiency with respect to the pleasures of sight, say, would have inclined
it, inplausibly, to recognize a virtue with respect to these pleasures. Be
cause the EN wakes no coaparable assunption, it can Mention such pleasures
safely.
13 Aristotle goes too far in his confidence that non-hunan aniwals take
no pleasure in senses other than touch. If pleasure is (found in) the uninpeded activity of a natural state, as Aristotle holds (cf. EN Vil.12, 1153*1415), there seeas to be no good reason for thinking that aniwals' sensory
pleasures are restricted to touch and taste.
14 I shall have wore to say in Section VI (below) about Aristotle's arguwent for elininating the pleasures of taste fron the sphere of tenperance.
18 According to III.10, 1118*4-8, not even all tactile pleasures —
notably not the "refined" pleasures of the gynnasiun — are regulated by
tenperance.
14 EE III.2, 1230*22-35, locates the class of pleasures with which ten
perance is concerned; 1230*38 - 1231*7 isolates the class of pleasures to
which aniwals are sensitive; and 1230*36-38 notes that the two classes coin
cide.
tT The bluntest statenent of this idea occurs at De Sensu 1, 436*10-12:
"Each aninal insofar as it is an aninal has to have sense-perception, for it
is by this that we distinguish between what is and what is not an aninal."
Cf. also De Anina II.2, 413*1-4.
18 Aristotle seens not to know about anorexia. No doubt he would treat
it too as a pathological. Cf., though, n. 21 below.
λ
* The renainder of this paragraph freely sunnarizes the relevant por
tions of De Anina II.3-4.
20 Aristotle's oastrinarooi (III.11, 1118*19) — our boulenics — appar
ently have connon appetites even without physical needs, while anorexics have
the needs without the appetites.
at For the idea of a privative Motivational state, see R. B. Brandt,
"Traits of Character," Anerican Philosophical Quarterly, 7 (1970), pp. 23-37.
For a wodern account of tenperance which wakes it a privative state, see J. D.
Wallace, Virtues and Vices (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press,
1978), Ch. 3.
aa Cf., e.g., De Anina II.3, 414*4-6; EN III.1, 1111*32-3; |E II.7, 1223
a 34; and Rhetoric 1. 11, 1370*16-18.

